Constitutional Construction: A Guide to the Principles and Their Application by Antieau, C.J.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 51 | Issue 3 Article 1
2-1-1976
Constitutional Construction: A Guide to the
Principles and Their Application
C.J. Antieau
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
C.J. Antieau, Constitutional Construction: A Guide to the Principles and Their Application, 51 Notre Dame L. Rev. 357 (1976).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol51/iss3/1
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: A GUIDE TO THE
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
C. J. Antieau
Table of Contents
I. Introduction -------------------------------------------.........-------------------------------- 358
II. The Search for Intent ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 359
A. Ascertaining Intent from Legislative Records ----------------------------- 359
1. Records of the Ratifying State Conventions or Legislatures ------ 359
2. Statements of Delegates in the Constitutional Conventions ------ 360
3. Statements in the Congress That Proposed an Amendment ------ 362
4. Development of the Specific Language Employed --------......--- 363
B. Ascertaining Intent from Contemporary Law and Social Con-
ditions ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------  365
1. Conditions Leading to Adoption of the Clause ---......---------- 365
2. The Common Law Contemporaneous with Adoption ------------- 370
3. The History and Circumstances of the Times ----------------------- 375
4. The Meaning Given to Words at the Time of Adoption ------ 377
5. Proceedings in the Continental Congress .............------------------ 378
C. Ascertaining Intent from Contemporary Exposition or Construc-
tion -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 378
1. Contemporary Legislative Exposition --------------------- .... - ---- ------- 378
2. Contemporaneous Exposition Generally -------------------------------- 380
3. Contemporary Statements Outside the Constitutional Conven-
tion or Congress -----------------------------------------------------------------------.. 382
4. Publications Widely Circulated at the Time of Ratification ------ 383
5. The Practical Construction to a Constitutional Provision ----- 384
III. The Search for Intent: Particular Matters Involved in the Construc-
tion of Amendments ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 386
IV. Construction According to the Larger Purposes and Objectives of the
Framers -----------------------.........................---------------------------------------- ----- 387
V. Conclusion: Going Beyond the Framers' Intent in a Changing
Society -----------------------------------------------------.....------------------------------------ 392
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: A GUIDE TO THE
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
C. J. Antieau*
I. Introduction
Over the years, United States Supreme Court Justices have customarily
said that the first principle of constitutional construction is to capture and honor
the intent of the persons who framed and adopted the Constitution.' "The whole
aim of construction, as applied to a provision of the Constitution," said Justice
Sutherland in 1934, "is to discover the meaning, to ascertain and give effect to
the intent, of its framers and the people who adopted it."2 Every clause of the
Constitution must be construed so as to "express the intention of its framers,"
said Justice Strong speaking for the Supreme Court in 1874.' Justice Goldberg,
writing in 1964, said: "Our sworn duty to construe the Constitution requires...
that we read it to effectuate the intent and purposes of the Framers."4 "Any
other rule of construction," said Chief Justice Roger Taney speaking for the
Court in 1857 in the Dred Scott case, "would abrogate the judicial character of
this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the
day-5
Scholars also have generally agreed that the originator's intent should be
controlling. Joseph Story wrote in 1833: "The first and fundamental rule in the
interpretation of all instruments, is to construe them according to the sense of
the terms, and the intention of the parties."6 Thomas Cooley, in his influential
Constitutional Limitations, agreed that: "The object of construction, as applied
to a written constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting
it." 7
While this principle of construction is easily stated, its application is
perilously difficult. How is it possible to determine the intent of the framers as to
the precise meaning of words written nearly 200 years ago? Records are, in most
cases, meager; even when they exist, it often strains credibility to believe that the
intent manifested by a letter or a recorded debate accurately represents the will
of the mass of people. Nevertheless, courts and lawyers are often faced with the
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; S.J.D., 1952, LL.M., 1951, University
of Michigan; J.D., Detroit College of Law, 1941; M.S., 1935, B.S., 1934, Detroit Institute
of Technology.
1 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 545 (1959). "When-
ever the United States Supreme Court has felt itself called upon to announce a theory for its
conduct in the matter of constitutional interpretations, it has insisted, with almost uninter-
rupted' regularity, that the end and object of constitutional construction is the discovery of
the intention of those persons who formulated the instrument or of the people who adopted
it." TenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional
Construction, 27 CALIF. L. Rav. 157 (1939).
2 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934).
3 Woodson v. Murdock, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 351, 369 (1874).
4 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 288-89 (1964).
5 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857).
6 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 383 (1833).
7 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 124 (8th ed. 1927) (emphasis supplied).
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necessity of constitutional construction, and they have utilized numerous sources
through the years to determine the framers' intent. Among these various sources
are records of ratifying legislatures and constitutional conventions, the con-
temporary common law, and practical construction at the time of adoption. The
use of these and other sources is detailed within this article.
Even when the intent of the framers is discerned with some degree of con-
fidence, one must still ask whether it should control if it is in conflict with the
needs of modem society. When is it appropriate to look to the larger purposes of
the Constitution in implementing its language in a changing world? These
questions are always present in any problem of constitutional construction and,
therefore, are considered in the latter sections of this article.
II. The Search for Intent
A. Ascertaining Intent from Legislative Records
1. Records of the Ratifying State Conventions or Legislatures
Constitutional conventions and Congress can only propose a constitutional
provision or amendment. The people of the states, through their representatives,
actually make them the law of the land. Therefore, the proceedings of the state
conventions and legislative sessions dealing with the adoption of the Constitution
or amendments should be given considerable weight.8 James Madison once
stated that whenever it is necessary to go beyond the words of the Constitution to
ascertain its meaning, it is essential to "look for [that meaning], not in the Gen-
eral Convention, which proposed, but in the State Conventions, which accepted
and ratified the Constitution."' In 1821 Madison again emphasized that the
meaning of the Constitution is to be found "in the sense attached to it by the
people in their respective state conventions where it received all the authority
which it possessed." 1 Ten years later, in a letter to a friend, Madison remarked:
Another error has been in ascribing to the intention of the Convention which
formed the Constitution, an undue ascendancy in expounding it. Apart
from the difficulty of verifying that intention, it is clear, that if the meaning
of the Constitution is to be sought outside of itself, it is not in the proceed-
ings of the Body that proposed it, but in those of the State Conventions,
which gave it all the validity and authority it possesses."
Supreme Court Justices have looked many times to the statements and
proceedings of the state ratifying conventions as guides to the construction of the
United States Constitution. To illustrate, the Supreme Court in 1895 carefully
examined discussions in the ratifying conventions of Connecticut, Massachusetts,
8 "The Constitution derives its force, not from the Convention which framed it, but
from the people who ratified, it; and the intent to be arrived at is that of the people." State
v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 527, 143 A.2d 571, 577 (1958).
9 6 WarrnGs oF JAMES MADISON 272 (G. Hunt ed. 1900).
10 9 WRrrrNos OF JAMES MADISON 71-72 (G. Hunt ed. 1908).
11 Id. at 477.
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New York, and Virginia to ascertain what the people adopting the Constitution
meant by "direct" taxes."2 In 1908, in Twining v. New Jersey,3 the Court con-
strued the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and concluded that
the term did not embrace a privilege against self-incrimination, since only four of
the original 13 state conventions called to ratify the Constitution expressed any
interest in demanding that the privilege be given constitutional protection.' 4 In
1934, when the Supreme Court construed the Constitution to bar suits by foreign
governments against the states without their consent, it gave great weight to the
statements of Madison and Marshall in the Virginia convention, stating clearly
that this was what the Constitution meant.'5 In 1964, when the court ruled in
Wesberry v. Sanders that each congressional district must have approximately
the same population, the Court stated: "In the state conventions, speakers urging
ratification of the Constitution emphasized the theme of equal representation in
the House ... .""1 Four years later, Justice Harlan referred extensively to the
proceedings in the state legislatures which had ratified the fourteenth amend-
ment to prove that they never intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights."7 The
following year, the Supreme Court in Powell v. McCormack" justified its con-
clusion by the statement: "The debates at the state conventions also demonstrate
the Framers' understanding that the qualifications for members of Congress had
been fixed in the Constitution."'"
Scholars have been in general agreement that if the intent of "the constitu-
tional generation" is to be the guide to construction of the Constitution, then
one proper inquiry is the intent of those responsible for its adoption or ratifica-
tion.2"
2. Statements of Delegates in the Constitutional Convention
Because it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the intent of
those who originally adopted the Constitution in regard to a specific word or
clause, both the Supreme Court and constitutional scholars, in construing the
Constitution, have frequently looked to the statements of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention. To the extent that delegates made their understand-
ing of various constitutional provisions known to their constituents, the delegates'
manifest intent can be said to be that of the states.
As early as 1838, the Supreme Court recognized that construction of the
Constitution requires attention to "the meaning and intention of the convention
12 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 427, 565 (1895).
13 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
14 Id. at 109.
15 Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1934).
16 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 15 (1964).
17 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 175-76 (1968) (Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
See also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 460 (1954) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting).
18 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
19 Id. at 540.
20 T. COOLEY, CONSTrUTIONAL LimrrArzoNs 101 (7th ed. 1903); C. MILLER, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF IsToRY 159 (1969).
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which framed and proposed it for adoption and ratification .... 2' From "the
intention of the Convention," the Supreme Court concluded in 1869 that it was
the framers' intent to confer the entire taxing power on Congress, subject only to
the expressed limitations.22 In 1895, the Court looked to the debates in the Con-
stitutional Convention when it ascertained what were "direct" taxes within the
constitutional language." Five years later, the Court made extensive reference to
the debates in the Constitutional Convention in holding that the uniformity
clause was intended to require only geographical uniformity for indirect taxes
levied by the federal government.24
To support a holding that the President could remove purely executive
officers without congressional authority or control, Chief Justice Taft reasoned in
1926: "The debates in the Constitutional Convention indicated an intention to
create a strong executive .... "25 In a 1945 construction of the treason clause,
the Court exhaustively analyzed the proceedings of the 1787 Convention, par-
ticularly noting the remarks of Madison, Mason, Dickinson, Franklin, and
Wilson." In 1964, the Supreme Court relied heavily upon debates in the Con-
stitutional Convention to support its conclusion that congressional districts must
be of approximately the same population.27 Five years later, the debates in the
Convention were largely responsible for the Court's ruling that Congress could
not add to the constitutionally indicated qualifications for members of Congress.28
Reports of debates in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 are scanty,
however, and at times are an inadequate source for the construction of organic
law. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court in 1934, observed: "In the
construction of the contract clause, the debates in the Constitutional Convention
are of little aid.29 The Court added in 1970: "The 'very scanty history [of this
provision] in the records of the Constitutional Convention' sheds little light either
way on the intended correlation between Article III's 'jury' and the features of
the jury at common law."8
In construing state constitutions, state courts have also customarily utilized
debates and remarks at the conventions responsible for proposing those docu-
ments."1 The Maryland supreme court is representative: "In construing the
Constitution we are to consider the circumstances attending its adoption and
what appears to have been the understanding of the people when they adopted
it, and one of the useful and most helpful sources is the debates of the conven-
tion."2
21 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838).
22 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 540 (1869).
23 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 562-63 (1895).
24 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 100 (1900).
25 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926).
26 Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1945).
27 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964).
28 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 532 (1969).
29 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427 (1934).
30 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 93 (1970), citing 39 HIJv. L. Rav. 917, 969 (1926).
31 Ex parte Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 267 Ala. 139, 99 So. 2d 118 (1957); Morgan
v. Board of School Comm'rs, 248 Ala. 22, 25, 26 So. 2d 108, 110 (1946) ; Schwartz v. People,
46 Colo. 239, 104 P. 92 118 (1909); Woessner v. Bullock, 176 Ind. 166, 93 N.E. 1057 (1911);
State v. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362, 133 N.W. 1046 (1911).
32 McMullen v. Shepherd, 133 Md. 157, 160, 104 A. 424, 425 (1918).
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3. Statements in the Congress that Proposed an Amendment
Just as courts have used statements in the Constitutional Convention in their
construction of the original compact, so too have they utilized debates in the
Congress that proposed a particular amendment. For example, when the
Supreme Court ruled in 1898 that children of Chinese parents, who were in-
eligible for citizenship at that time, were citizens of the United States if born
here, it placed such heavy reliance upon statements made on the floor of the 39th
Congress, which had proposed the fourteenth amendment, that it found that
this would be an effect of the amendment if ratified."
Justice Hugo Black, in urging the "incorporation theory" upon his colleagues
in 1947, placed emphasis upon remarks made on the floor of the 39th Congress,
especially those of Representative Bingham." In 1968, when the Supreme Court
held that the thirteenth amendment enforcement clause enabled Congress to
eliminate badges of servitude imposed by private individuals, Justice Stewart
gave great weight to the statements made in the Congress that had proposed that
amendment, especially those of Senator Trumbull and Representative Wilson. 5
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, in
their dissent in the 1972 case Furman v. Georgia,"8 stressed the remarks of
Representative Livermore in the first Congress as casting light upon the meaning
of the Bill of Rights in general and the eighth amendment in particular. Con-
trarily, Justice Douglas was rather unimpressed by the remarks of members of the
first Congress: "[T]he debates of the First Congress... throw little light on its
intended meaning."3 "
The Supreme Court in 1974 made extensive use of discussions in the
Congress which had proposed the fourteenth amendment in ruling that equal
protection of the laws was not violated when a state refused the voting franchise
to convicted felons, even after they had served their sentences. 9 Again in the
following year, the Court explored at length the debates in the first Congress that
had proposed the double jeopardy clause, and concluded that no general ban on
appeals by the government in criminal prosecutions was intended.40
Notwithstanding these examples, it must be acknowledged that the Supreme
Court has at times refused to give any significant weight to statements by in-
dividual Representatives and Senators in the Congress that had proposed an
amendment. For instance, the Court said in 1900:
It is clear that what is said in Congress upon such an occasion may or may
not express the views of the majority of those who favor the adoption of
the measure which may be before that body, and the question whether the
proposed amendment itself expresses the meaning which those who spoke in
its favor may have assumed that it did, is one to be determined by the
language actually used, and not by the speeches made regarding it.
33 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, (1898).
34 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 94 (1947) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
35 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
36 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
37 Id. at 391-92.
38 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 45 (1974).
39 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
40 United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975).
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What individual Senators or Representatives may have urged in debate,
in regard to the meaning to be given to a proposed constitutional amend-
ment... does not furnish a firm ground for its proper construction, nor is
it important as explanatory of the grounds upon which the members voted
in adopting it.
In the case of a constitutional amendment it is of less materiality than
in that of an ordinary bill or resolution. A constitutional amendment must
be agreed to, not only by Senators and Representatives, but it must be ratified
by the legislatures, or by conventions in three fourths [sic] of the states
before such amendment can take effect. The safe way is to read its language
in connection with the known condition of affairs out of which the occasion
for its adoption may have arisen, and then to construe it, if there be therein
any doubtful expressions, in a way, so far as is reasonably possible, to forward
the known purpose or object for which the amendment was adopted.41
This lack of regard for statements made in a Congress that had proposed a par-
ticular amendment was manifested again the following year when the Court
noted:
The arguments of individual legislators are no proper subject for judicial
comment. They are so often influenced by personal or political considera-
tions, or by the assumed necessities of the situation, that they can hardly be
considered even as the deliberate views of the persons who make them, much
less as dictating the construction to be put upon the Constitution by the
courts.
42
Notwithstanding the language of the Supreme Court in the last two cases,
the relative paucity of reliable information as to what the states intended when
they ratified the various amendments, and the superiority of the reporting of
congressional debates on proposed amendments, will probably lead the courts
in construing the Constitution to continue utilizing remarks and debates in Con-
gress, assuming implicitly that these were reported to the people of the states
and are likely to represent their understanding of the meaning or purpose of the
words used in a particular provision.
4. Development of the Specific Language Employed
The Supreme Court, in construing a clause in the original Constitution, has
often been aided by an examination of the progress of the clause as it proceeded
through the Convention. For example, in 1895 the Court followed such pro-
ceedings to determine what was meant by "direct taxes" in the Constitution."
Four years later, it looked to the proceedings in the Convention to help construe
the unifornity of taxation clause." In 1925, in construing the clause conferring
the pardoning power upon the President, the Court carefully examined the
41 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 601-02 (1900) (citations omitted).
42 Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 254 (1901).
43 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 568-69 (1895).
44 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 100 (1900).
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progress of that clause through the Constitutional Convention." Again in 1933,
in determining the admiralty power, the Court was convinced that the proceed-
ings in the Convention evidenced an intent to transfer to the new federal govern-
ment all the admiralty powers formerly possessed by the Confederation.8
Constitutional construction has frequently been aided by an examination of
various proposals rejected and language deleted by delegates at the Constitutional
Convention 47 In 1901, for instance, in construing the article conferring original
Supreme Court jurisdiction, the Court pointed out that the original suggestion
in the Convention proposal was to give to the Senate the resolution of disputes
between the states, but that this had been rejected. The Court observed further
that the Committee on Revision in the Convention "struck out the provision
excluding from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court disputes between the states
in matters respecting jurisdiction and territory. The entire jurisdiction of con-
troversies between states was bestowed upon the Supreme Court.148 In 1926,
when Justice Brandeis was endeavoring to construe Presidential power to remove
federal personnel, he emphasized that in the Convention, "the outstanding fact
remains that every specific proposal to confer such uncontrollable power upon the
President was rejected."4 In construing article III's limitations upon Congress,
Justice Douglas in 1973 stressed that the Constitutional Convention had rejected,
with only one state voting to adopt, a proposal that judges of federal courts be
made removable by the Executive on application of the Congress."
Comparably, in construing amendments to the Constitution the Supreme
Court has often referred to the progress of an amendment through the Congress
that had proposed the amendment. To illustrate, in an 1885 case construing the
grand jury indictment clause with its reference to "infamous crimes," the Court
gave weight to the form in which the clause had originally been introduced by
James Madison at the first session of the House of Representatives.5 1 Also, in
1920 Justice McKenna traced the changes made in the wording of the proposed
eighteenth amendment as it progressed through the Congress.5" In 1970, in
construing the jury clause of the sixth amendment, the Supreme Court devoted
much attention to the progress of that amendment through Congress.55
State courts, in construing their own constitutions, regularly consult proceed-
ings in their constitutional conventions.54 The proceedings of clauses through
45 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 112 (1925).
46 United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 148 (1933).
47 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) (1810).
48 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 223 (1901).
49' Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 294 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
50 Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 412-13 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
51 Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 424 (1885).
52 Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 402-03 (1920) (McKenna, J., dissenting).
53 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 94 (1970).
54 "The proceedings of the convention in which the constitution was framed may be
examined in considering the purpose of a given article or section." Franklin Nat'l Bank v.
Clark, 26 Misc. 2d 724, 733, 212 N.Y.S.2d 942, 953-54 (Sup. Ct. 1961). "When constitu-
tional questions have arisen, the court has availed itself of pertinent records of the Constitutional
Convention for an insight into the effect intended from the provision in question." Ward v.
Stevens, 86 Ariz. 222, 344 P.2d 491, 495 (1959).
"If there is any ambiguity or uncertainty in sections of the Constitution, a court may look
to proceedings of the constitutional convention for aid in construction." Williams v. Baidridge,
48 Idaho 618, 619, 284 P. 203, 204 (1930). See also Walters v. Cease, 388 P.2d 263 (Alas.
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constitutional conventions, like statements made at such conventions, are legiti-
mate sources for constitutional construction, since there is some probability that
they disclose the intent of the people who adopted the constitution. This has
been well expressed by the North Dakota supreme court:
The intent of the convention is not controlling in itself; but, as its proceed-
ings were preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution, the
understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms ...
goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when
they ratified it. The people depended largely upon the interpretation and
construction placed upon the various constitutional provisions by the dele-
gates who framed them.
55
In the absence of better proof of what the people intended when they adopted
constitutions or ratified amendments, courts will likely continue to be guided
in their construction of those provisions by the development of the language em-
ployed in them.
B. Ascertaining Intent from Contemporary Law and Social Conditions
1. Conditions Leading to Adoption of the Clause
It has been recognized since the constitutional generation that the search
for the intent of those responsible for our organic law can profitably include an
inquiry into the contemporaneous evils that were deemed so unbearable that
they must be guarded against permanently in constitutional language. James
Madison wrote on December 20, 1828, to William Rives: "It must be allowed
by all that the best key for the text of the Constitution... is to be found in the
contemporary state of things and the maladies or defects which were to be pro-
vided for."5 6 Two years later, Madison again stressed that sound constitutional
construction requires an exploration of the evils and defects for which the Con-
stitutional Convention was called.
5 7
Courts and scholars have accepted ever since the propriety in constitutional
construction of looking to the mischief designed to be avoided and the object to
be accomplished by a constitutional clause.5" In 1830 the Supreme Court
explored the mischief intended to be prevented by the inclusion in the Con-
stitution of the prohibition upon "bills of credit." After examining the ante-
cedent evils, the Court rejected a literal reading of those words, and concluded
instead that the clause should be construed to ban "any paper medium by a
State government for the purpose of common circulation." 9 Eight years later
Sup. Ct. 1964); Desert Waters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 91 Ariz. 163, 370 P.2d 652 (1962);
Higer v. Hansen, 67 Idaho 45, 170 P.2d 411 (1946); Loring v. Young, 239 Mass. 349, 132
N.E. 65 (1921); State v. Marsh, 149 Neb. 1, 29 N.W.2d 799 (1947); Yelle v. Bishop, 55
Wash. 2d 286, 347 P.2d 1081 (1959).
55 Miller v. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362, 369, 133 N.W. 1046, 1049 (1911).
56 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 663-64 (A. Rives ed. 1865).
57 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MJAIsoN 370-75 (G. Hunt ed. 1908).
58 Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.., 12 F. Supp. 37, 40 (W.D. Ky.
1935); COOLEY, supra note 7, at 141.
59 Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410, 438 (1830).
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the Court stated generally: "In the construction of the Constitution we must
look to the history of the times and examine the state of things existing when it
was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief and the
remedy."' Justice Miller was speaking for the Court's majority in the Slaughter-
House Cases of 1873 when he said, in reference to the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment:
In the light of the history of these amendments, and the pervading purpose
of them.. . it is not difficult to give a meaning to this clause. The existence
of laws in the states where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which
discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was
the evil to be remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden. 6
1
Justice Miller, in his 1891 lectures on constitutional law, stated: "A very useful
key to the construction of a statute or a constitution is to inquire what was the
evil to be removed, and what remedy did the new instrument propose; so that
when any question arises requiring a judicial construction of any of its clauses,
it is important to go back and ascertain the evil that was intended to be
remedied."62
Justice George Shiras, speaking for the Court in 1901, stated: "In this, as
in other instances, when called upon to construe and apply a provision of the
Constitution of the United States, we must look, not merely to its language, but
to its historical origin . ,,.' Faced with the task of construing the contract
clause in 1934, Justice Sutherland wrote:
The necessities which gave rise to the provision, the controversies which
preceded, as well as the conflicts of opinion which were settled by its adop-
tion, are matters to be considered to enable us to arrive at a correct result.
The history of the times, the state of things existing when the provision was
framed and adopted, should be looked to in order to ascertain the mischief
and the remedy. As nearly as possible we should place ourselves in the
condition of those who framed and adopted it. And if the meaning be at
all doubtful, the doubt should be resolved, wherever reasonably possible to
do so, in a way to forward the evident purpose with which the provision
was adopted.64
Construction requires, the Supreme Court stated in 1941, that "we turn to the
words of the Constitution read in their historical setting as revealing the purpose
of its framers, and in search for admissible meanings of its words which, in the
circumstances of their application, will effectuate those purposes." 5 The Court
added: "If we remember that 'it is a Constitution we are expounding,' we can-
not rightly prefer, of the possible meanings of its words, that which will defeat
rather than effectuate the constitutional purpose.""6
60 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 627, 723 (1838).
61 Slaughter-House 'Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872).
62 S. MILLER, LECTURES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 82 (1891).
63 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 219 (1901).
64 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
65 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317-18 (1941).
66 Id. at 316.
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There were discernible weaknesses in the form of government under the
Articles of Confederation; to overcome them it was the apparent consensus of
those who framed and adopted the Constitution that an effective government
needed a general taxing power, a power over interstate commerce, and power
to declare and wage war. In construing the taxing power of Congress, the Su-
preme Court remarked in 1900:
The necessities which gave birth to the Constitution, the controversies which
preceded its formation, and the conflicts of opinion which were settled by its
adoption, may properly be taken into view for the purpose of tracing to its
source any particular provision of the Constitution in order thereby to be
enabled to correctly interpret its meaning.
67
The Court, after noting "[t]he paralysis which the Articles of Confederation
produced upon the Continental Congress because of the want of power in that
body to enforce necessary taxation to sustain the government,"6 readily con-
cluded that the clause granting the taxing power to the federal government
should be broadly construed.
When interpreting a number of other clauses in the original Constitution,
such as the contract clause and the ban upon religious test oaths, courts have
properly made reference to historical practices which the persons who adopted
the Constitution found anathema. Concerned with the construction of the con-
tract clause, the Supreme Court has pointed out that "following the revolutionary
period... an ignoble array of legislative schemes for the defeat of creditors and
the invasion of contractual obligations"" was clearly the reason for the inclu-
sion of that clause in the Constitution.
An analysis of the antecedent evils to be ameliorated aids in the construction
of amendments perhaps even more than it does in giving meaning to the lan-
guage of the original Constitution. Referring to the earlier stated orthodox rule
of examining antecedent evils as a guide to construction, Justice Sutherland
stated in 1920: "This sound rule is as applicable to the amendments as to the
provisions of the original Constitution.""0 The fresh memory of such detested
practices as the use of torture in punishing criminals, the use of general search
warrants, and the financing of a preferred state church with its attendant dis-
criminations against those who did not share its beliefs, stimulated many of the
delegates in the state conventions called to ratify the Constitution to demand a
bill of rights that would provide protection against these practices. Many of the
persons in these state ratifying conventions later served in the first Congress, and
their views are valuable in determining what was intended by those who ratified
the Bill of Rights.71 Those who adopted the Bill of Rights undoubtedly wished
to repudiate much of the earlier English common law, and this has been appre-
ciated by Justices and scholars concerned with constitutional construction. Cooley
67 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 95 (1900).
68 Id.
69 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
70 Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 260 (1920).
71 Half of the members of the Senate and eight members of the House in the first
Congress had participated in ratifying conventions. TenBroek, suprz note 1.
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wrote: "The English common-law rule which made libels on the constitution
or the government indictable . . . seems to us unsuited to the conditions and
circumstances of the people of America, and therefore never to have been
adopted by the several States."'72 Similarly, Justice Holmes wrote in 1919: "I
wholly disagree with the argument of the government that the First Amendment
left the common law as to seditious libel in force."73 Justice Black adverted many
times to the unworthy practices of England and the Colonies, which those who
adopted the first amendment wished to avoid, as a guide to proper construction
of that amendment. 4 In ascertaining their intent, Black said for the Court in
1947 that it is necessary to look to "the conditions and practices which they
fervently wished to stamp out in order to preserve liberty for themselves and for
their posterity." '75
Because many of the constitutional generation seem to have thought that
citizens were recklessly and unnecessarily put to criminal trial, the grand jury
indictment clause was recommended by the Massachusetts Convention of 1788
when it ratified the original United States Constitution. In construing this clause,
the Supreme Court has given noticeable weight to the wording of the recom-
mendation by the people of Massachusetts."0
In 1972, in attempting in Furman to construe the ban upon cruel and un-
usual punishment in the eighth amendment, a number of Justices made refer-
ences to the remarks and proceedings in the state conventions which had ratified
the original Constitution. Justice Brelnan, in his concurring opinion, noted the
remarks made in the Massachusetts and Virginia conventions. Chief Justice
Burger, in a dissent joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, recog-
nized the propriety of looking to the statements and proceedings in the state
conventions called to ratify the Constitution: "The records of debates in several
of the State conventions called to ratify the 1789 draft Constitution submitted
prior to the addition of the Bill of Rights show that the framers' exclusive con-
cern was the absence of any ban on tortures."78
Events antecedent to the ratification of later amendments throw equal light
on the intent of the persons responsible for the adoption of those amendments.
Undoubtedly it was to prevent federal courts from entertaining suits against the
states, as permitted by the Supreme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia,"9 that caused
the states to rush through the eleventh amendment; the clause has always been
construed with that intent in mind.8" It has been commonly accepted that repu-
diation of the infamous Dred Scott decision was the intent and purpose of those
responsible for the adoption of the first clause of the fourteenth amendment.8
And the Supreme Court has construed the fifteenth amendment so as to capture
72 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 429 (4th ed. 
1878).
73 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
74 E.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960).
75 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
76 Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422-24 (1884).
77 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
78 Id. at 377.
79 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
80 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1899).
81 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 300-01 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1872).
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the intent of those responsible for it: to end the injustice of denying black citi-
zens the right to vote.82 In 1873, the Court said in the Slaughter-House Cases
that the civil war amendments were to be construed "in the light of the history
of these amendments and the pervading purpose of them. 813 The Court added:
"The existence of laws in the states where the newly emancipated Negroes
resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as
a class, was the evil to be remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are for-
bidden."8 " Chief Justice Vinson spoke for the Court in 1948 when he said:
The historical context in which the Fourteenth Amendment became a part
of the Constitution should not be forgotten. Whatever else the framers
sought to achieve, it is clear that the matter of primary concern was the
establishment of equality in the enjoyment of basic civil and political rights
from discriminatory action on the part of the States based on consideration
of race or color.8 5
Referring to the Slaughter-House Cases, Vinson remarked: "Seventy-five years
ago this Court announced that the provisions of the Amendment are to be con-
strued with this fundamental purpose in mind."8 6
State courts are in general agreement that both the national and state
constitutions "are to be interpreted in view of the history behind the enactment,
the purpose sought to be accomplished by its enactment and the evil sought to
be remedied."8
Courts will undoubtedly continue to construe constitutions by reference to
those antecedent evils and inadequacies which those who adopted the constitu-
tions desired to both avoid and rectify. However, since it is a constitution that
is being construed, clauses generally stated are not to be limited in their con-
struction to outlawing the particular evils known to the generation responsible
for the clause. The Supreme Court customarily acknowledges that corrective
constitutional clauses are to be construed broadly and liberally. In 1910, the
Court refused to restrict the eighth amendment ban upon cruel and unusual
punishment to those particular punishments known and despised by the gene-
ration that gave us the Bill of Rights. Speaking for the Court, Justice McKenna
stated:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from
an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be
necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not
ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use
the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach immortality as
nearly as human institutions can approach it." The future is their care
82 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 73 (1872).
83 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1872).
84 Id.
85 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948).
86 Id.
87 Ruth v. Industrial Comm'n, 107 Ariz. 572, 575, 490 P.2d, 828, 831 (1971).
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and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy
can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contem-
plation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be. Under any
other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would
be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little
value and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas.
Rights declared in words might be lost in reality. And this has been recog-
nized. The meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against
narrow and restrictive construction.88
Indeed, to satisfy the emerging moral standards of a maturing society, the Su-
preme Court will construe clauses such as the ban upon cruel and unusual
punishment so as to ban practices which, if known to them, the constitutional
generation was apparently prepared to accept.8 " The intent and purpose of
those who gave us the Bill of Rights can be understood in their broader dimen-
sions as efforts to safeguard human dignity and to confine the temporary trustees
of political power in their relations with the citizenry. These larger objectives
represented by the eighth amendment are honored when courts ban such punish-
ments as death, branding, and whipping, even though they were condoned by
the constitutional generation.
2. The Common Law Contemporaneous with Adoption
In construing certain clauses of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has
at times been guided by the earlier English and American common law. Justice
Wayne, speaking for the Court in 1856, examined the pardoning power of the
English Crown when he construed the Presidential pardoning power under our
Constitution." In construing the same power 69 years later, Chief Justice Taft
said:
The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by
reference to the common law and to British institutions as they were when
the instrument was framed and adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the
Convention, who submitted it to the ratification of the Convention of the
thirteen states, were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common
law, and thought and spoke in its vocabulary. They were familiar with other
forms of government, recent and ancient, and indicated in their discussions
earnest study and consideration of many of them, but when they came to
put their conclusion into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft,
they expressed them in terms of the common law, confident that they could
be shortly and easily understood."'
"The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States," noted the Court
in 1888, "is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in
the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its
history.5
92
88 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
89 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
90 Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 310-12 (1855).
91 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1924).
92 Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1887).
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In construing the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the
Supreme Court looked for guidance to the English common law and practice.
Said the Court:
As the object of the first eight amendments to the Constitution was to in-
corporate into the fundamental law of the land certain principles of natural
justice which had become permanently fixed in the jurisprudence of the
mother country, the construction given to those principles by the English
courts is cogent evidence of what they were designed to secure and of the
limitations that should be put upon them.93
Two years later the Court remarked: "The Constitution... must be interpreted
in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were famil-
iarly known to the framers of the Constitution.... The language of the Con-
stitution ... could not be understood without reference to the common law."
The Court added generally:
In construing any act of legislation, whether a statute enacted by the legis-
lature, or a Constitution established by the people as the supreme law of the
land, regard is to be had, not only to all parts of the act itself, and of any
former act of the same lawmaking power, of which the act in question is
an amendment; but also to the condition, and to the history of the law as
previously existing, and in the light of which the new act must be read and
interpreted.9'
Speaking for the Supreme Court in 1905, Justice Brewer stated: "One other
fact must be borne in mind, and that is that in interpreting the Constitution we
must have recourse to the common law."95 Two years later, again speaking for
the Court, Justice Brewer added: "The common law throws light on the mean-
ing and scope of the Constitution of the United States."9" In 1966, Justice
Harlan construed the speech and debate clause, and observed that the language
was almost identical to the English Bill of Rights of 1689. After exploring Eng-
lish common law and history, he concluded that the privilege was primarily
created to prevent intimidation by the Executive and accountability before a
possibly hostile judiciary.
It is in construction of the procedural clauses of the Constitution that the
Supreme Court has been most willing to be guided by antecedent English and
American common law.98 The fifth amendment provision for grand jury indict-
ment, said the Court in 1884, "manifestly had in view that rule of the common
law."9  The Court added: "The scope and effect of this, as of many other
provisions of the Constitution, are best ascertained by bearing in mind what the
93 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 (1895).
94 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 653-54 (1898).
95 South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 449 (1905).
96 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1906).
97 United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178-85 (1966).
98 "For eighty years the Supreme Court has maintained the general position that in
determining whether a given procedure satisfies the due process guarantees, it is necessary to
inquire into English common law and American colonial practice." Goebel, Constitutional
History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM. L. Rav. 555, 557 (1938).
99 Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 423 (1884).
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law was before."'00  In 1956 the Court, in studying English and American
common law, reported that "grand jurors could act on their own knowledge and
were free to make their presentments or indictments on such information as they
deemed satisfactory," and went on to hold that an indictment would, therefore,
be valid even though based entirely on hearsay evidence.''
The sixth amendment clauses have also been construed with reference to
the common law. In 1904, the Court ruled that the sixth amendment right of
trial by jury in criminal cases was to be read in the light of the English and
American common law, and concluded that this constitutional right was unavail-
able in prosecutions for "petty offenses."'02 In passing upon the question whether
government employees could sit on juries in criminal prosecutions, the Supreme
Court in 1936, through Chief Justice Hughes, made reference to English and
Colonial practices and said generally: "Whether a clause in the Constitution is
to be restricted by a rule of the common law as it existed when the Constitution
was adopted depends upon the terms or nature of the particular clause."'03 Justice
Harlan said in 1970: "Sound constitutional interpretation requires, in my view,
fixing the federal jury as it was known to the common law." "History," he
reflected, "continues to be a wellspring of constitutional interpretation."'0 4 Again,
in construing the sixth amendment right of confrontation, the Court said in
1895: "We are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it
existed at the time it was adopted ... ."105
Speaking for the Supreme Court in 1935, Justice Sutherland stated that the
seventh amendment right of trial by jury in civil cases is to be construed accord-
ing to "the rules of the common law in respect of trial by jury as these rules
existed in 1791,"1' since the persons responsible for the adoption of this amend-
ment allegedly intended to adopt the rules of the common law. The Court
claimed in 1970 that it has consistently looked "at common law carrying the
right to jury trial, at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted.' 0 7  The
dissenters acknowledged: "All agree that this means the reach of the Amend-
ment is limited to those actions that were tried to the jury in 1791 when the
Amendment was adopted."'08
Construction of the due process clauses in their procedural aspects has often
been abetted by reference to English and American common law. Due process
of law in procedural matters, the Court said in 1856, will ordinarily reflect the
common law. It stated:
To what principles, then, are we to resort to ascertain whether this process,
enacted by Congress, is due process? To this the answer must be twofold.
We must examine the Constitution itself, to see whether this process be in
conflict with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to
100 Id. at 422.
101 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
102 Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 70 (1904).
103 United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 142 (1936) (dissenting opinion).
104 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 124 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
105 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
106 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1934).
107 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970).
108 Id. at 543. (Burger, O.J., Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
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those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and
statute law[s] of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which
are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by
having been acted on by them after the settlement of this countryj ° 9
Procedural due process should be construed, said Justice Harlan in 1969, ac-
cording to those "concepts which are part of the Anglo-American heritage."'11
Even Justice Harlan, however, was willing to acknowledge that historical
materials antedating adoption of the Constitution and its amendments may often
be so meager as to provide little aid in current construction. "History," he said,
"seems to give us very little insight into the intended scope of the Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause." ''
Even when historical materials are adequate to indicate the common law
at the time a constitutional clause was added, they should not control construc-
tion of the procedural or any other clauses, for to do so would be to impede
development of the law. In 1908, Justice Moody commented on construction
according to the common law: "If that were so, the procedure of the first half
of the seventeenth century would be fastened upon the American jurisprudence
like a straight jacket, only to be unloosed by constitutional amendment."' 2 To
construe the Constitution solely by reference to the earlier common law, in the
language of Justice Matthews, "would be to deny every quality of the law but
its age, and to render it incapable of progress or improvement." 1 '
Indeed, even the Justices who have been most willing to construe parts of
the Constitution according to the earlier common law have admitted that con-
struction of some clauses and amendments should not be guided by the common
law. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court in 1935, said: "Whether a
clause in the Constitution is to be restricted by the rules of the English law as
they existed when the Constitution was adopted depends upon the terms or the
nature of the particular clause in question."'
It has generally been held that clauses conferring power upon the federal
government are not to be confined by the earlier common law. Speaking of the
rules favoring construction according to the common law, Justice Sutherland
noted: "Certainly, these rules have no such restrictive effect in respect of any
constitutional grant of governmental power....""5 The second Justice Harlan,
a strong believer in using historical materials for constitutional construction,
wrote in 1969: "It cannot be seriously argued as a general matter that the
109 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276-77
(1855), followed in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390 (1898). See Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78, 100 (1908).
110 Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1960) (Harlan, J., concurring,
Black, J., dissenting).
111 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
112 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908).
113 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 388 (1898).
114 Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R., 294 U.S. 648,
669 (1934); see United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 142 (1936).




constitutional limits of Congressional power are coterminous with the extent of
its exercise in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.""1
6
Nor should the broad constitutional guaranties of liberty and equality be
construed narrowly or restricted to the preexisting common law or conditions of
society. The Supreme Court held in 1936 that the Anglo-American com-
mon law is not to control construction of the first amendment, stating:
Undoubtedly, the range of a constitutional provision phrased in terms of
the common law sometimes may be fixed by recourse to the applicable rules
of that law. But the doctrine which justifies such recourse, like other canons
of construction, must yield to more compelling reasons whenever they
exist.... And, obviously, it is subject to the qualifications that the com-
mon-law rule invoked shall be one not rejected by our ancestors as unsuited
to their civil and political conditions."17
Admittedly, the Court said in 1925 that "the Fourth Amendment is to be con-
strued in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when
it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as
the interests and rights of individual citizens."" 8 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court today is properly prepared to find a search or seizure unreasonable for
practices utterly unknown to the persons responsible for the adoption of the
amendment."'
Chief Justice Warren, with Justices Black and Douglas, warned in 1958
against construing the jury right of the sixth amendment solely according to
common law criteria. They said:
Those who formed the Constitution struck out anew free of previous shackles
in an effort to obtain a better order of government more congenial to human
liberty and welfare. It cannot be seriously claimed that they intended to
adopt the common law wholesale. They accepted those portions of it which
were adapted to this country and conformed to the ideals of its citizens and
rejected the remainder. In truth there was widespread hostility to the com-
mon law in general and profound opposition to its adoption into our juris-
prudence from the commencement of the Revolutionary War until long
after the Constitution was ratified.2
The suggestion that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amend-
ment should be construed according to common law practices in England and
the Colonies at the time of adoption of the Bill of Rights has been conclusively
repudiated."'
Those persons responsible for the framing and adoption of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights rejected the common law in many areas, and undoubtedly
would have been opposed to straitjacketing federal practices forever to the rules
and practices of their times. The common law existing at the time of ratification
116 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 280 (1969).
117 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248-49 (1936) (citation omitted).
118 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
119 Berger v. New York, 395 U.S. 41 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
120 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 212 (1958).
121 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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of the Constitution (or any of its amendments), therefore, should seldom prevent
construction of the Constitution in a manner necessitated by the demands of
contemporary society. Indeed, Justice Harlan remarked: "It is, of course, true
that history should not imprison those broad guarantees of the Constitution
whose proper scope is to be determined in a given instance by a blend of his-
torical understanding and the adaptation of purpose to contemporary circum-
stances." ' 2 State courts also have often construed their own constitutions by
reference to the common law.
123
3. The History and Circumstances of the Times
To ascertain the intent of those who proposed and adopted a constitutional
provision, courts frequently look to the history and circumstances of the times
when the clause or amendment was adopted. "The most helpful rule for inter-
preting the Constitution," one federal court has concluded, "is to look to the his-
tory of the times and examine the state of things existing when it was formed,
and adopted."' 24 The court added: "In applying this rule, we may look to con-
ditions at the time of its adoption, the general spirit of the times, and the prevail-
ing sentiment among the people."'
25
The Supreme Court has always endorsed examination of the history and
circumstances of the times as a guide to intent in constitutional construction.
In 1838, that tribunal stated: "In the construction of the Constitution we must
look to the history of the times and examine the state of things existing when it
was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief and the
remedy.' 26 Looking there, the Court soon discovered that 11 of the original 13
states were involved in boundary disputes and held accordingly that it was the
intent of those responsible for the Constitution that the Court have jurisdic-
tion to resolve such controversies. 27
The Civil War amendments have been interpreted by the courts only after
referring to "the history of the times" when they were adopted. 28 Justice Black,
in 1964, looked at this history and concluded that the purpose of the fourteenth
amendment was, inter alia, to legitimize the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1866. A careful examination of the Act, which resulted in finding no provision
for equality of accommodation in private restaurants, led Justice Black to decide
that the amendment was not to be construed to outlaw this type of racial discrim-
ination, at least without congressional action."'
Noting that the word "religion" was not defined anywhere in the Constitu-
tion, the Court, in construing the first amendment in 1878, said: "We must go
elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning, and nowhere more appropriately,
122 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 124-25 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
123 See, e.g., Bohannon v. Corporation Comm'n, 82 Ariz. 299, 313 P.2d 379 (1957).
124 R.C. Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn, 12 F. Supp. 570, 588 (W.D. Ky. 1935).
125 Id.
126 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 723 (1838).
127 I&
128 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67 (1872).
129 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 338 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
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we think, than to the history of the times in the midst of which the provision was
adopted."18
When nine years later the Supreme Court was called upon to construe
the grand jury clause of the fifth amendment, it looked to the history of the times
when this amendment was added to the Constitution.
Undoubtedly the framers of this article had for a long time been absorbed
in considering the arbitrary encroachments of the Crown on the liberty of
the subject, and were imbued with the common-law estimate of the value of
the grand jury as part of its system of criminal jurisprudence. They, there-
fore, must be understood to have used the language which they did in
declaring that no person should be called to answer for any capital or other-
wise infamous crime, except upon an indictment or presentment of a grand
jury, in the full sense of its necessity and of its value.
131
"The safe way" to construe the Constitution, according to the Supreme
Court in 1900, "is to read its language in connection with the known condition
of affairs out of which the occasion for its adoption may have arisen, and then
to construe it, if there be therein any doubtful expressions, in a way, so far as is
reasonably possible, to forward the known purpose or object for which the
amendment was adopted."'8 2 In construing the Constitution, a court "must
necessarily consider it in the light of the circumstances as they existed at the
time. ... "133
The "common, contemporary understanding" of the American community
at the time the Constitution or an amendment was adopted has been sought as
a guide to intent on a number of occasions. In 1930, the Supreme Court ruled
that article III was to be construed so as not to render the Court's jurisdiction
exclusive in domestic relations suits involving foreign diplomats situated in this
country. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, said: "If when the Constitu-
tion was adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations of
husband and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States, there
is no difficulty in construing the instrument accordingly. ... " Justice Goldberg
agreed in 1964 that constitutional provisions were to be construed with reference
to "the contemporary understanding" at the time of adoption.'35 As he read the
history and circumstances surrounding the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the "contemporary understanding of the general public was that freedom
of discrimination in places of public accommodation was part of the fourteenth
amendment's promise of equal protection," and it was this construction that he
gave to the amendment.'
Conditions prevailing at the time of adoption were again considered helpful
in 1974 when the Court had to construe whether the fourteenth amendment
allowed the states to disenfranchise convicted felons. In reaching an affirmative
130 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878).
131 Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
132 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602 (1900).
133 Ken-Rad Tube & Lamp Corp. v. Badeau, 55 F. Supp. 193, 198 (W.D. Ky. 1944).
134 Popovich v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1950).
135 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 289 (1964) (concurring opinion).
136 Id. at 290.
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conclusion to that question, the Court noted that light is shed "on the under-
standing of those who framed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus
on the meaning of section two, by the fact that at the time of the adoption of the
Amendment, twenty-nine States had provisions in their constitutions which
prohibited, or authorized the legislature to prohibit, exercise of the franchise by
persons convicted of felonies or infamous crimes." '
Courts will likely continue to look to the history and conditions of the times
when a clause or amendment was adopted as an aid to construction. However,
practices condoned by the populace in 18th or 19th century America are often
poor guides as to how the Constitution might best serve our contemporary
society; a larger appreciation of human dignity should not be denied in constitu-
tional construction, nor should the growth of the law be thwarted, because of
earlier conditions.
4. The Meaning Given to Words at the Time of Adoption
Sometimes in its quest for intent, the Supreme Court has insisted that words
and language used in the Constitution are to be construed according to their
meaning when the relevant clause or amendment was adopted. "The language
used in the Constitution," said Justice Wayne for the Court in 1856, "must be
construed with reference to its meaning at the time of its adoption." ' The
Court stated in 1887: "It is never to be forgotten that in the construction of the
language of the Constitution... we are to place ourselves as nearly as possible
in the condition of the men who framed that instrument." '39
It is suggested that words used in a constitution intended to endure for un-
told generations should not be restricted to their meanings at the time the pro-
vision was first adopted:
The provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having
their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted
from English soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered
not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their
origin and the line of their growth.140
Similarly, Justice Frankfurter concluded: "It is an inadmissibly narrow con-
ception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitu-
tion and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them." 41
In dealing with the great general phrases of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has ordinarily understood that the intent of the framers is better honored
by a construction that abjures literal meanings found in dictionaries or practices
of the times when the provision was adopted; this understanding has furthered
137 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 48 (1974).
138 Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (17 How.) 307, 311 (1856).
139 Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
140 Compers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914).




both the evolution of the law and a growing perception of human dignity. 42
5. Proceedings in the Continental Congress
A few of the Constitution's clauses have their parallel in the prior Articles of
Confederation, adopted by the Second Continental Congress; here the search for
the intent of the Founding Fathers can be aided by recourse to the proceedings
of the Continental Congress. To illustrate, when the Supreme Court in 1900
was construing the federal taxing power, it concluded that only geographical
uniformity was required for the indirect taxes because "the proceedings of the
Continental Congress... make it clear that the words 'uniform throughout the
United States,' which were afterwards inserted in the Constitution of the United
States, had, prior to its adoption, been frequently used, and always with reference
to a geographical uniformity."'
'1
In ascertaining intent of those who framed and adopted the privileges and
immunities clause of article IV, as well as the privileges and immunities clause of
the fourteenth amendment, a court could well note the clause contained in the
Articles of Confederation assuring to the people "all privileges and immunities of
free citizens" 4 and construe the constitutional language accordingly.
C. Ascertaining Intent from Contemporary Exposition or Construction
1. Contemporary Legislative Exposition
Courts have frequently made reference to contemporary legislative exposi-
tion to fix the meaning of a constitutional provision or phrase. For example, in
1829 a New York court stated: "Great deference is certainly due to a legisla-
tive exposition of a constitutional provision, and especially when it is made almost
contemporaneously with such provision, and may be supposed to result from the
same views of policy and modes of reasoning which prevailed among the framers
of the instrument expounded."' 45
The Supreme Court has often construed the Constitution according to the
meaning provided by contemporary Congresses. The acts of the first Congress,
especially the Judiciary Act of 1789, have always been deemed high authority
in construing the Constitution. After remarking that "great weight has always
been attached, and very rightly attached, to contemporaneous exposition,"'
4
Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court in 1821, added: "A contempo-
raneous exposition of the Constitution, certainly of not less authority than that
which has just been cited [the Federalist Papers], is the judiciary act itself. We
know, that in the congress which passed that act were many eminent members
of the convention which formed the constitution."' 7 The Court has frequently
142 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
143 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 96 (1900).
144 C. ANTIEAU, 1 MODERN CONSTTUTIONAL LAW § 9:13, (1969).
145 People v. Green, 2 Wend. 266, 274-75 (N.Y. 1829).
146 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821).
147 Id. at 420.
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stressed the fact that many Senators and Representatives in the first Congress
had served in either the Constitutional Convention or the state ratifying con-
ventions, or both, as ample justification for respecting constructions expressed in
that Congress."'8 When the Court held in 1816 that it possessed appellate
jurisdiction on federal questions decided by the state courts, Justice Story em-
phasized that this jurisdiction had been established by legislation of the First
Congress, "composed as it was.., of men who had acted a principal part in
framing, supporting, or opposing that constitution."' 49  In reference to the
Judiciary Act of 1789, Justice Sutherland wrote in 1930: "That act was passed
shortly after the organization of the government under the Constitution, and on
the day preceding the proposal of the first ten amendments by the first Congress.
Among the members of that Congress were many who had participated in the
convention which framed the Constitution and the act has always been con-
sidered, in relation to that instrument, as a contemporaneous exposition of the
highest authority." " ' Three years later, Justice Sutherland added: "The Ju-
diciary Act of 1789 has always been regarded as practically contemporaneous
with the Constitution, and as such, of great value in expounding the meaning of
the judiciary article of that instrument."''
In construing the Presidential power to remove federal personnel, the
Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Taft, indicated that the views
expressed on the floor of the first Congress by Oliver Ellsworth were "entitled to
great weight."' 52 The views expressed in that Congress are so influential, said
the Chief Justice, "because this was the decision of the First Congress, on a
question of primary importance in the organization of the Government, made
within two years after the Constitutional Convention and within a much shorter
time after its ratification; and... because that Congress numbered among its
leaders those who had been members of the Convention."'5 3 The first Congress,
said Taft, was "a Congress whose constitutional decisions have always been re-
garded, as they should be regarded, as of the greatest weight in the interpreta-
tion of that fundamental instrument."' 54 The Chief Justice continued: "This
Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a contemporaneous legislative
exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our government and the
framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs,
acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be given to its
provisions."' 55 Professor Miller has pointedly observed: "In the case on the
presidential removal power, the First Congress was treated as if it were a second
session of the Constitutional Convention.""'
Construction of the Bill of Rights has been aided by reference to various
acts of the first Congress, since it was this Congress that proposed the first ten
148 TenBroek, supra note 1, at 171.
149 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 351 (1816).
150 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 300-01 (1930).
151 Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 573-74 (1933).
152 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
153 Id. at 136.
154 Id. at 174-75.
155 Id. at 175.
156 MILLER, supra note 20, at 190.
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amendments. By way of example, the Supreme Court in 1886 asserted in dictum
that it would not violate the fourth amendment for federal officials to seize goods
concealed to avoid federal duties payable on them. This had, according to the
Court, been specifically authorized by the first Congress; and the Court added:
"As this act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the
original Amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members of that
body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as 'unreasonable,' and
they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment." '
In construing the original Constitution, the Supreme Court has looked not
only to the first Congress but to other early Congresses as well.
The construction placed upon the Constitution by the first act of 1790, and
the act of 1802, by the men who were contemporary with its formation,
many of whom were members of the convention which framed it, is of itself
entitled to very great weight, and when it is remembered that the rights
thus established have not been disputed during a period of nearly a century,
it is almost conclusive.158
When the Supreme Court held in 1900 that an inheritance tax was not a direct
tax within the meaning of the constitutional clause and, consequently, could be
levied by the federal government without apportionment among the states, it was
impressed with the fact that legacy taxes had been imposed by Congresses as
early as 1797. This legislation, noted the Court,
was adopted at a time when the founders of our government and framers of
our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, thus giving a
practical construction to the Constitution which they had helped to establish.
Even the then members of the Congress who had not been delegates to the
Convention which framed the Constitution must have had a keen apprecia-
tion of the influences which had shaped the Constitution and the restrictions
which it embodied, since all questions which related to the Constitution and
its adoption must have been, at that early date, vividly impressed on their
minds."59
It can legitimately be questioned whether influences of colonial times "must
have been" vividly impressed upon the minds of Congressmen in 1797, or
whether they "must have had a keen appreciation of the influences which shaped
the Constitution." It is a significant and perhaps presumptuous step to say that
the views of Congressmen at the turn of the century represented the intent of the
people who ratified the Constitution in 1788. Statements and proceedings in
Congress may frequently represent views so parochial as to be completely at odds
with the spirit of those who gave us the Constitution.
2. Contemporaneous Exposition Generally
Almost since the ratification of the Constitution, jurists have generally
endorsed the use of contemporaneous exposition in construing that document.
157 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
158 Burrows-Giles Litho. Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884).
159 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 56 (1900).
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James Madison wrote that, in construing the Constitution, "the intention of the
parties to it ought to be kept in view; and that as far as the language of the
instrument will permit, this intention ought to be traced in the contemporary ex-
position."' 60 John Marshall, writing in 1821, could say: "Great weight has
always been attached, and very rightly attached, to contemporaneous exposi-
tion.,,16
Thomas Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists 6 2 has been largely re-
sponsible for the "wall of separation" construction given to the first amendment
establishment ban, although he had been a member neither of the Constitutional
Convention nor of the Virginia ratifying convention.
In 1803, when it was objected that the Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitu-
tionally assigned Supreme Court Justices to circuit duty, the Court responded:
"To this objection, which is of recent date, it is sufficient to observe that practice,
and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing with the
organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed
fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible
nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or
controlled."' 63 In 1827, Justice Johnson wrote that contemporaneous exposition
is to be resorted to freely in construing the original Constitution: "It proceeds
upon the presumption, that the contemporaries of the constitution have claims to
our deference on the question of right, because they had the best opportunities
of informing themselves of the understanding of the framers of the constitution,
and of the sense put upon it by the people when it was adopted by them."''
Justice Story wrote: "Contemporary construction is properly resorted to,
to illustrate, and confirm the text, to explain a doubtful phrase, or to expound an
obscure clause and in proportion to the uniformity and universality of that con-
struction, and the known ability and talents of those, by whom it was given, is
the credit to which it is entitled."'6 5 The Supreme Court has indicated that the
contemporary construction placed on the Constitution by Justices Ellsworth,
Paterson, and Wilson, who had all been members of the Constitutional Conven-
tion, is to be given great weight. 6
In 1851, when the Supreme Court sustained the imposition of pilot fees
by the port of Philadelphia, it noted that such charges had levied frequently
both before and after the adoption of the Constitution: "[T]his contemporaneous
construction of the Constitution since acted on with such uniformity in a matter
of much public interest and importance, is entitled to great weight, in determin-
ing whether such a law is repugnant to the Constitution."' 67
In fixing the meaning of language used in the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has been impressed with contemporaneous construction given by executive
160 WarriNos OF JAmns MADiSON, supra note 57, at 59.
161 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821).
162 S. PAOamR, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518-19 (1943).
163 Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
164 Ogden v. Saunders 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 290 (1827).
165 STORY, supra note 6, § 407.
166 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 545 (1869). See also Ex parte Gross-
man, 267 U.S. 87, 115 (1925).
167 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 315 (1851).
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and administrative officials. In 1891 the Court said: "In all cases of ambiguity,
the contemporaneous construction, not only of the courts but of the departments,
and even of the officials whose duty it is to carry the law into effect, is universally
held to be controlling." '168 The Supreme Court in 1892, after noting that the
states had provided for the choice of such electors in the first four Presidential
elections, ruled that a state could permit the election of Presidential electors by
congressional districts. "[T]he contemporaneous practical exposition of the Con-
stitution was too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled. 16 9
Willoughby wrote in 1929 that the Supreme Court has never held itself
bound by legislative or executive construction, "however contemporaneous their
first statement with the adoption of the Constitution."'7 0 Contemporaneous con-
struction by persons who did not participate either in a Convention or in a state
convention that ratified the Constitution only provides a possible intent of those
responsible for the Constitution. The same is true in the case of amendments
when the construction given was by someone who was neither in the Congress
that proposed nor in the state legislatures or conventions that ratified the amend-
ment. As Story suggested long ago, this kind of contemporaneous construction
should be subject to qualification and reserve.' 7 ' The value of this constructional
aid grows weaker as years intervene between ratification of the constitutional
clause and the proffered practice or statement. "Upon the question of the true
meaning and effect of the Constitution," said Justice Gray in 1895, "opinions
expressed more than a generation after the adoption of the Constitution have far
less weight than the almost unanimous voice of earlier and nearly contemporane-
ous judicial declarations and practical usage."' 2
3. Contemporary Statements Outside the Constitutional Convention or the
Congress
In construing the Constitution and its amendments, the Supreme Court has
noted contemporary statements made by prominent Americans outside the Con-
stitutional Convention or outside the Congress that proposed the amendment
being construed.
For example, in 1900 the Supreme Court referred to the statements of a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Luther Martin, made after the Con-
vention before the Maryland Legislature to which he was reporting on the pro-
posed Constitution, to show that the uniformity clause of article I, § 9 was in-
tended only to ensure geographical uniformity of federal taxation. 3 In defend-
ing his thesis that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights,
Justice Hugo Black in 1947 placed heavy reliance upon remarks by Representa-
tive Bingham of Ohio, made in a later Congress than that which had proposed
the amendment. Justice Black asserted generally: "Formal statements sub-
168 Schell's Executor v. Fauche, 138 U.S. 562, 572 (1891).
169 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892).
170 W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 29 (2d ed.
1929).
171 STORY, supra note 6, § 406.
172 Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 169 (1895).
173 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 106 (1900).
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sequent to adoption of the Amendment by the congressional leaders who par-
ticipated in the drafting and enactment of it are significant." 7'
There is additional evidence of construction according to remarks of lead-
ing Americans outside the Convention and the Congress. In 1964, when the
Supreme Court ruled that each congressional district must be of approximately
the same population, it relied in part upon a speech by James Wilson, a delegate
to the Convention, made soon after the Constitution was adopted . 5 To aid in
construction of the jury clause of the sixth amendment, the Court in 1970 looked
to a letter sent by James Madison to James Pendleton in 1789Y.17 Similarly,
there is no doubt that some Justices, in construing the establishment ban of the
first amendment, have been strongly influenced by remarks of James Madison
before and after the ratification of that amendment. 7
It is probable that the remarks of leading Americans made about the time
of ratification sufficiently represent the views of a considerable segment of the
electorate to justify the courts noting such as a guide to constitutional construc-
tion. However, casual remarks made many years later should be used cautiously;
memory fades and minds change with later events.
4. Publications Widely Circulated at the Time of Ratification
James Madison once stated that the Constitution must be given "its true
meaning as understood by the Nation at the time of its ratification."'7 8 And in
construing federal and state constitutions, courts have frequently looked to pub-
lications which were widely circulated in the community during the time when
ratification was being considered.
On many occasions the Federalist Papers have been used by the Supreme
Court in construing the Constitution. As early as 1819, Chief Justice John
Marshall observed: "[T]he opinions expressed by the authors of that work have
been justly supposed to be entitled to great respect in expounding the coristitu-
tion."' 79 Two years later Marshall added:
The opinion of the Federalist has always been considered as of great author-
ity. It is a complete commentary on our constitution; and is appealed to by
all parties in the questions to which that instrument has given birth. Its
intrinsic merit entitled it to this high rank; and the part two of its authors
performed in framing the constitution, put it very much in their power to
explain the views with which it was framed. These essays having been
published while the constitution was before the nation for adoption or
rejection and having been written in answer to objections founded entirely
on the extent of its powers, and on its diminution of State sovereignty, are
entitled to the more consideration where they frankly avow that the power
objected to is given, and defend it. 80
174 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 110 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
175 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
176 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 95 (1970).
177 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 644, 712 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
178 See note 160 supra.
179 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433 (1819).
180 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821).
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Speaking of the Federalist Papers, Chief Justice Chase said in 1870 that
"the views which it promulgated may be fairly regarded as the views of those
who voted for adoption."'' Seven years later, the Supreme Court held that the
property in a vessel could be taxed by the state of the owners without violating
the constitutional ban on tonnage duties, explaining: "Support to that view is
also derived from one of the numbers of the Federalist, which has ever been re-
garded as entitled to weight in any discussion as to the true intent and meaning
of the provisions of our fundamental law."' 2 In 1934, the Supreme Court uti-
lized Federalist Paper No. j14 to explain the rationale of the contract clause."5 3
In that same year the Court recorded the influence of Hamilton's general remarks
in Federalist Paper No. 81 to the effect that the states would not ordinarily be
subject to suits in the federal courts.' 4
The Federalist Papers were once again used by the Supreme Court in 1966
to aid in construction of the speech and debate clause, and the protection it
should afford Congressmen.' 8 Three years later, they were largely influential in
persuading the Court that Congress could not constitutionally add to the qualifi-
cations of its members. 6 There are several other instances in which the Court
has turned to the Federalist Papers for guidance in construing the Constitution.'
The theory that the Federalist Papers probably represented the views of the
people in the state ratifying conventions is somewhat weakened, however, when
it is realized that a number of the conventions had completed their work before
the Papers were published.' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and other tri-
bunals will likely continue to refer to them as reliable guides to the intent of the
American community in ratifying the original Constitution.
State courts, in construing their own constitutions, have been willing to con-
sider publications widely circulated in the community prior to a vote on a
proposed constitution or amendment.' According to the California supreme
cour.t, arguments contained in a pamphlet sent to the voters "may be resorted to
as an aid in determining the intent of the framers of the measure and of the
electorate when such aid is necessary." 90
5. The Practical Construction Given to a Constitutional Provision
A practical construction given to a constitutional clause by going back to
the time of its adoption is customarily thought to mirror the intent of those re-
181 Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 585 (1870).
182 Wheeling, Parkersburg & Cincinnati Transp. Co. v. City of Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 280
(1879).
183 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427 (1934).
184 Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323 (1934).
185 United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
186 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 539 (1969).
187 See Pierson, The Federalist in the Supreme Court, 33 YALE L.J. 726, 728-35 (1925);
TenBroek, supra note 1.
188 TenBroek, supra note 1, at 171.
189 Ward v. Stevens, 86 Ariz. 222, 344 P.2d 491 (1959); California Inst. of Tech. v.
Johnson, 55 Cal. App. 2d 856, 132 P.2d 61 (1942); Baumbaugh v. San Diego County, 44
Cal. App. 2d 898, 113 P.2d 218 (1941). But cf. McGuire v. Wentworth, 120 Cal. App. 340,
7 P.2d 729 (1932).




sponsible for the provision and, as such, be an acceptable guide to an interpreta-
tion of the Constitution. Courts in construing the basic law can properly look,
said James Madison, writing in 1830, at the "early, deliberate and continued
practice under the Constitution." '91
The Supreme Court has often relied on the early practice under the Con-
stitution as a guide to construction of that document. The Court in 1803 held
that its members could sit in circuit, largely because this had been the practice
since the adoption of the Constitution. Such practice, said the Court, "affords
an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary
interpretation of the most forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong
and obstinate to be shaken or controlled." '92 In reference to this decision, Cooley
has aptly remarked: "The practical construction was regarded as conclusive." 3
In 1816, the Supreme Court, in holding that it possessed appellate jurisdic-
tion from the state courts on federal questions, explained that this practice had
been generally accepted from the organization of the high court.94 "The early
understanding and practice" under the grand jury indictment clause convinced
the Supreme Court in 1885 that the benefits of this clause should be available
to anyone subject to imprisonment in a federal prison for a term of years. 95 In
1942, the Court ruled that persons could be tried by military commissions when
charged with crimes against the laws of war, because this had been the accepted
understanding since the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. "It
is a construction of the Constitution which has been followed since the founding
of our government, and is now continued," remarked the Court, adding, "such
a construction is entitled to the greatest respect." ' Construing the ban upon
establishment of religion, the Court concluded in 1970: "It is significant that
Congress, from its earliest days, has viewed the Religion Clauses of the Constitu-
tion as authorizing statutory real estate exemption to religious bodies."197 In
concurring, Justice Brennan said: "Significantly, within a decade after ratifica-
tion, at least four States passed statutes exempting the property of religious
organizations from taxation." He continued:
The existence from the beginning of the Nation's life of a practice, such
as tax exemption for religious organizations, is not conclusive of its constitu-
tionality. But such practice is a fact of considerable import in the interpreta-
tion of abstract constitutional language. On its face, the Establishment
Clause is reasonably susceptible of different interpretations regarding the
exemptions. This Court's interpretation of the clause, accordingly, is ap-
propriately influenced by the reading it has received in the practices of the
Nation .... The more long-standing and widely accepted a practice the
greater its impact upon constitutional interpretation. 9 s
191 See note 160 supra.
192 Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 308 (1803).
193 CooLEY, supra note 7, at 149.
194 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816).
195 Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426 (1895).
196 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1942).
197 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 677 (1970).
198 Id. at 681 (concurring opinion).
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As it construed the fourteenth amendment in 1974 to determine if the states could
constitutionally disenfranchise convicted felons, the Court found most impressive
"the Congressional treatment of States readmitted to the Union following the
Civil War,"' 9 9 noting that disenfranchisement for crime was regularly accepted
by the Congress as a proper provision of the constitutions of the former Con-
federate States as they were readmitted to representation in Congress."'
Since practical construction as a guide to constitutional meaning has
ordinarily been justified by the Supreme Court because it purportedly casts light
upon the intent of those who framed and adopted a constitutional clause or
amendment, it is most valuable when it exists shortly after adoption and of
lesser value when it occurs only many years after ratification. In 1969, when the
Court refused to recognize a power in Congress to exclude from membership for
reasons not mentioned in the Constitution, it considered precedents but con-
cluded they did not control the decision.
Had these Congressional exclusion precedents been more consistent, their
precedential value still would be quite limited.... The relevancy of prior
exclusion cases is limited largely to the insight they afford in correctly ascer-
taining the draftsmen's intent. Obviously, therefore, the precedential value
of these cases tends to increase in proportion to their proximity to the Con-
vention in 1787.201
The Supreme Court will likely continue to note congressional and Presi-
dential practices under the Constitution as guides to construction, with the
justification that they indicate, at least to some extent, the intent of the persons
responsible for the ratification of the Constitution or its subsequent amend-
ment. 2 2 However, as the Court shifts increasingly from a historical to a
sociological jurisprudence, it will in its jurisprudence of interests continue to
make such references, not because the practices necessarily reflect the intent of
18th century Americans, but because they represent contemporary interests and
values deserving constitutional consideration.
III. The Search for Intent: Particular Matters Involved in the Construction of
Amendments
Amendments to the Constitution "must be construed with the . .. clauses
of the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before the Amend-
ment was adopted," according to the Supreme Court.2 - Thus, in construing
the sixteenth amendment to determine if Congress could tax stock dividends,
the Court remarked: "The Sixteenth Amendment must be construed in connec-
tion with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed
to them before the Amendment was adopted."2 4
199 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 48 (1974).
200 Id. at 49.
201 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969).
202 Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952); Wheeler Lumber, Bridge & Supply Co. v. United
States, 281 U.S. 572 (1930); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).




In construing the first 10 amendments-the Bill of Rights-the Supreme
Court has readily acknowledged that an examination of the work of the state
conventions called to ratify the original Constitution is helpful, especially since
their demands were the basis for these amendments." 5
It has sometimes been suggested that phrases from the original Constitu-
tion, or from earlier amendments repeated almost verbatim in later amendments,
are to be consistently construed. For example, the four dissenters in the Slaughter-
House Cases urged that the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment was to be construed like the same clause in article IV on the theory
that both were designed to protect fundamental rights." 6 Regrettably, they
failed to convince their brethren. Somewhat similarly, due process of law in the
fifth amendment protects the claim to equality before the law where the federal
government is involved, while in the fourteenth amendment due process is not
generally used to secure freedom from discrimination, since the equal protection
clause of that amendment is readily available. So too is fourteenth amendment
due process more compendious than than of the fifth, embracing many of the
rights safeguarded against the federal government by specific provisions of the
Bill of Rights.
Where later amendments have been expressed in language earlier used by
the Supreme Court, that tribunal has indicated the amendment should be con-
strued in the manner intended by the Court on the occasion of its earlier use of
the words. The Court has said:
The words "in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,"
in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, must
be presumed to have been understood and intended by the Congress which
proposed the Amendment, and by the legislatures which adopted it, in the
same sense in which the like words had been used by Chief Justice Marshall
in the well known case of The Exchange.2 0 7
Finally, it is generally accepted that "an amendment shall not be extended
by loose construction, so as to repeal or modify" earlier provisions of the Con-
stitution, unless the intent is unmistakable.08
IV. Construction According to the Larger Purposes and
Objectives of the Framers
Respect for those who gave us the Constitution and later amendments need
not be manifested solely by inquiring into the meaning they attributed to certain
words and phrases. Indeed, they are more fittingly honored when, in constitu-
tional construction, their larger purposes and objectives are sought and the
organic law is interpreted accordingly. As the Supreme Court has noted on
numerous occasions, inquiry into the specific intent underlying particular words
is often fruitless, and it is not unreasonable to assume that those Americans who
205 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
206 Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
207 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 687 (1898).
208 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920).
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enshrined the concepts of due process, equal protection, and privileges and
immunities intended these words to be a commitment to the larger and enduring
values of our society."0 9
Virtually from the Supreme Court's beginning it has been clear that the
larger purposes and objects of the framers were discoverable and preferable to
the specific intent behind particular words and phrases. Justice Wilson, writing
in Chisholm v. Georgia210 in 1793, stated that reference to the Preamble divulged
the framers' intent "to establish justice," "to form a more perfect Union," and
"to ensure domestic tranquility," whereupon the Court "deduced from the de-
clared objects, and the general texture of the constitution of the United States,"
the conclusion that the people had intended to make the states suable in the
federal courts. 1' Justice Story commented in his influential work on the Con-
stitution2. 2 that the Preamble to the Constitution indicates the larger purposes
to be respected by a court.
It may well be presumed, that the language used will be in conformity to
the motives, which govern the parties, and the objects to be attained by the
Instrument. Every provision in the instrument may therefore fairly be pre-
sumed to have reference to one or more of these objects. And consequently,
if any provision is susceptible of two interpretations, that ought to be
adopted, and adhered to, which best harmonizes with the avowed intentions
and objects of the authors, as gathered from the declarations of the instru-
ment itself.
21
When the Supreme Court was faced in 1869 with construing the taxing
powers of Congress, the Court acknowledged a constant difficulty existed in
construing that provision, and moved on readily and more successfully to the
general intent of the Constitution. This allowed a conclusion that Congress was
to have a general taxing power, subject only to the limitations contained in that
document.214 Two years later in the Legal Tender Cases,"5 the Court, stressing
that the larger objects and purposes of the framers must guide constitutional
construction, noted that "when investigating the nature and intent of the powers
conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, it is indispensable to keep in view
the objects for which those powers were granted." 216 The Court added:
This is a universal rule of construction applied alike to statutes, wills, con-
tracts, and constitutions. If the general purpose of the instrument is ascer-
tained, the language of its provisions must be construed with reference to
that purpose and so as to subserve it. In no other way can the intent of the
framers of the instrument be discovered.
2 17
209 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92-95 (1970); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398, 426-30 (1934).
210 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
211 Id. at 465.
212 SvoRy, supra note 6, at 38.
213 Id.
214 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 540 (1869).
215 Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
216 Id. at 521.
217 Id. at 531-32.
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Again in 1901, although the Court found no proof of any specific intent on the
part of the framers to ban stamp taxes on export bills of lading, it held them
unconstitutional as violative of the clause prohibiting taxes on exports. After
looking at the larger purposes and intents of the framers, the Court concluded:
"The requirement of the Constitution is that exports should be free from any
governmental burden.21 8
Because "[t]he debates in the Constitutional Convention indicated an inten-
tion to create a strong executive, ' 219 the Court in 1926 ruled that the President
had power to remove purely executive officers, free from congressional control.
Noting that the persons who adopted our Constitution and Bill of Rights
were concerned generally with protecting individual integrity and privacy, Justice
Butler said in 1932 of the Constitution: "The direct operation or literal mean-
ing of the words used does not measure the purpose or scope of its provisions. 220
He added significantly: "[T]his Court has always construed provisions of the
Constitution having regard to the principles upon which it was established. 22'
In 1934, the Supreme Court ruled that the states were immune from suits
brought by foreign governments before it, notwithstanding the language of
article III and the fact that the eleventh amendment contains no words banning
such litigation. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, explained:
Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of
§ 2 of Article 3, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment
exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind
the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and
control. There is the essential postulate that the controversies, as contem-
plated, shall be found to be of a justiciable character. There is also the
postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty,
shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save where there has been
a "surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention .... " The ques-
tion is whether the plan of the Constitution involves the surrender of immu-
nity when the suit is brought against a State, without her consent, by a for-
eign State.
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After the Supreme Court decided that a dominant purpose of those who
ratified the Constitution was to ensure citizens the right to choose members of
the House of Representatives, it held that Congress controlled the primaries for
such elections. The language of Chief Justice Stone is worth quoting at length.
We may assume that the framers of the Constitution in adopting that section
[article I, § 4] did not have specifically in mind the selection and elimination
of candidates for Congress by the direct primary any more than they contem-
plated the application of the commerce clause to interstate telephone, tele-
graph and wireless communication which are concededly within it. But in
determining whether a provision of the Constitution applies to a new subject
218 Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 290 (1901).
219 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926).
220 United, States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932).
221 Id.




matter, it is of little significance that it is one with which the framers were
not familiar. For in setting up an enduring framework of government they
undertook to carry out for the indefinite future and in all the vicissitudes of
the changing affairs of men, those fundamental purposes which the instru-
ment itself discloses. Hence we read its words, not as we read legislative
codes which are subject to continuous revision with the changing course of
events, but as the revelation of the great purposes which were intended to
be achieved by the Constitution as a continuing instrument of government.
2 2 3
Chief Justice Stone concluded: "We turn to the words of the Constitution read
in their historical setting as revealing the purpose of its framers, and in search
for admissible meanings of its words which, in the circumstances of their appli-
cation, will effectuate those purposes."
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In 1942, Chief Justice Stone, in paying tribute to the late Justice Brandeis
and referring admiringly to Brandeis' approach to constitutional construction,
said:
He was emphatic in placing the principles of constitutional decision in a
different category from those which are guides to decision in cases where
the law may readily be altered by legislative action. He never lost sight of
the fact that the Constitution is primarily a great charter of government,
and often repeated Marshall's words: "it is a constitution we are expound-
ing... intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted
to the various crises of human affairs." Hence, its provisions were to be
read not with the narrow literalism of a municipal code or a penal statute,
but so that its high purpose should illumine every sentence and phrase of
the document and be given effect as a part of a harmonious framework of
government.
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Stone's words are, of course, beautifully descriptive of himself.
In 1948, the Supreme Court noted that the Preamble reveals that one of
the larger purposes of the Constitution was "to provide for the common defence."
In passing upon the constitutionality of congressional legislation authorizing the
recapture of excess war profits, the Court did not inquire whether the framers
intended to authorize such a statute, but stated rather that "the constitutional
structure and controls of our Government ...must be read with the realistic
purposes of the entire instrument fully in mind." '226 The same year, in construing
the fourteenth amendment, the Court did not ask whether those responsible for
the amendment intended specifically to outlaw state court actions enforcing
racially restrictive covenants. Rather the Court noted that "the primary con-
cern" of those who gave us the amendment was to preserve the basic civil and
political rights from discriminatory action. "[T]he provisions of the Amend-
ment," said Chief Justice Vinson, "are to be construed with this fundamental
purpose in mind. 227
Benjamin Cardozo, in his influential book, The Nature of the Judicial
Process, written in 1921 before he assumed his place on the Supreme Court,
223 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941).
224 Id. at 317-18.
225 Tribute to Justice Brandeis, 317 U.S. xlii, xlvii (1942).
226 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 782 (1948).
227 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948).
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forecast that the Court will increasingly minimize a search for specific intent
and emphasize instead a concern for the larger purposes and objects of those
who gave us the Constitution and its amendments. It is this kind of construction,
he wrote, that "with increasing frequency will be applied in the future, to fix
the scope and meaning of the broad precepts and immunities in state and na-
tional conventions."22
Professor Edward Corwin, in his 1934 criticism of Justice Sutherland's
dissenting opinion in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,229 asserted that
the framers had no concept of 1933 conditions prevailing in America, but that
they almost certainly had a broad intention that the contract clause, like all other
provisions of the Constitution, be adapted intelligently to the needs and crises
of later generations."' The same year Professor Karl Llewellyn wrote:
Where is no quarrel to be had with judges merely because they disregard
or twist Documentary language, or "interpret" it, to the despair of original
intent, in the service of what those judges conceive to be the inherent nature
of our institutions. To my mind such action is their duty. To my mind, the
judge who builds his decision to conform with his conception of what our
institutions must be if we are to continue, roots in the deepest wisdom...
certain fundamental features of our institutions need expression in the rul-
ings of the Supreme Court of the United States, whatever be the language
of the Document.28'
In construing language of the Constitution, intended by the framers and
those who adopted it as a guide to posterity, a court is to be concerned only
secondarily with what was intended for 1789 and primarily with adjusting
competing societal interests. The same is true of amendments. During the oral
argument in Brown v. Board of Education," ' the Supreme Court asked counsel
to respond to the following question:
[W]as it nevertheless the understanding of the framers of the Amendment
(a:) that future Congresses might, in their exercise of their power under
section 5 of the Amendment, abolish such segregation, or (b) that it would
be within the judicial power, in the light of future conditions, to construe
the Amendment as abolishing such segregation of its own force?2 3 3
With similar concern for ascertaining possible intent as to future solutions, Pro-
fessor Alexander Bickel wrote:
Should not the search for congressional purpose ... properly be twofold?
One inquiry should be directed at the congressional understanding of the
immediate effect of the enactment or conditions then present. Another
228 B. CArmozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
229 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
230 Corwin, Moratorium Over Minnesota, 82 U. PA:. L. REv. 311, 313-14 (1934).
231 Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLum. L. REv. 1, 33 (1934)
(emphasis supplied).




should aim to discover what if any thought was given to the long-range ef-
fect, under future circumstances, of provisions necessarily intended for
permanence.
234
The continued vitality of the Code Napoleon is certainly due in part to the
willingness of French jurists to inquire what the draftsmen would have intended
for modem France. The distinguished president of the highest French court,
M. Ballot-Beaupre, has explained that construction is according to le sens evolutif.
"We do not inquire," he has said, "what the legislator willed a century ago, but
what he would have willed if he had known what our present conditions would
be." ' So too in construing a constitution, courts concerned with framers'
intent are obligated to at least search for the kind of solutions the persons respon-
sible for the document would probably find acceptable under the conditions of
contemporary society. "The Constitution of the United States," one federal
court has concluded, "must be read as embodying general principles meant to
govern society and the institutions of government as they evolve through time.1
238
V. Conclusion: Going Beyond the Framers' Intent in a Changing Society
It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to determine with accuracy what
those who adopted the original Constitution meant by their use of particular
words and phrases, especially since the work of the state ratifying conventions
was poorly reported. And although there are better records of more recent
amendments, on what is undoubtedly the most important addition to the Con-
stitution, the fourteenth amendment, there is a useful record of debate and dis-
cussion in only one state, Pennsylvania. The search for the intent of those respon-
sible for the adoption of constitutions and amendments is not a skill that is
generally mastered by the American bar and, as in the past, future courts will
receive little light from such inquiries.
More importantly, even when the intent of the persons responsible for a
constitutional phrase seems apparent, this is only the beginning of constitutional
construction. Magnification of the framers' intent can blind justices to the
development of the law since the constitutional provision was adopted; it also
tends to deny that potential for growth that must be inherent in constitutions
intended for later generations, and neglects the necessary task of identifying,
weighing, and adjusting the values and interests competing in contemporary
society.
It can be safely said that many of the Founding Fathers themselves would
not have wanted constitutional construction to be limited to application of the
framers' intent. Thomas Jefferson, writing to a friend, Samuel Kercheval, on
July 12, 1816, said:
234 Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 89 HAXv. L. Rnv. 1,
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Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem
them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe
to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose
what they did to be beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged
to it, and labored with it. It deserved well of its country.... Laws and
institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As
that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are
made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the
change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with
the times.
287
In constitutional construction, the Supreme Court must go beyond the
original intent to ascertain both how an 18th century concept has changed with
maturing social values and how the courts have recognized the newer meanings
given to older words. Justice Holmes, ever unwilling to confine constitutional
construction to an analysis of framers' intent, wrote in 1914:
But the provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having
their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions.... Their
significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the
words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their
growth.
2S8
Six years later, Justice Holmes was again speaking for the Court when he said:
[When we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called
into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen
completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to
realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century
and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they
created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our
whole experience, and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years
ago.
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"[T]he present has a right to govern itself," said Justice Holmes.'" He looked
forward, he reported, "to a time when the part played by history in the explana-
tion of dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious research we shall
spend our energy on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons
for desiring them.21
Supreme Court Justices have often understood that constitutions are de-
signed for the future, and that in construing them it is imperative that they be
given the capacity for growth that can better serve the needs of a changing
society. Justice McKenna was speaking for the Court in 1910 when he said:
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A principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mis-
chief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They
are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They
are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach
immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it." The future
is their care and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which
no prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore,
our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.
Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application
as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would
have little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless
formulas.242
The Supreme Court has not often allowed the framers' intent to obstruct
a decision necessary for contemporary America. In Blaisdell, over Justice Suther-
land's insistence that the intent of the framers was clearly controlling of the deci-
sion, Chief Justice Hughes responded: "To ascertain the scope of the constitu-
tional prohibition [the Court must] examine the course of judicial decisions in its
application." He added that "full recognition of the occasion and general pur-
pose of the clause does not suffice to fix its precise scope.
24 s
Justice Felix Frankfurter refused to limit constitutional construction to a
search for framers' intent. Justices must look to "the pervasive feeling of society"
in construing the Constitution, he wrote.244 Two years later he added:
Due process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair
and right and just. The more fundamental the beliefs are the less likely
they are to be explicitly stated. But respect for them is of the very essence
of the due process clause. In enforcing them this Court does not translate
personal views into constitutional limitations. In applying such a large
untechnical concept as "due process," the Court enforces those permanent
and pervasive feelings of our society as to which there is compelling evidence
of the kind relevant to judgments on social institutions.24 5
Constitutional construction and the broad concept of ordered liberty "were
not frozen as of 1789 or 1868, respectively," said Justice Frankfurter and the
second Justice Harlan; they added: "While the language of the Constitution
does not change, the changing circumstances of a progressive society for which it
was designed yield new and fuller import to its meaning." '24 6 The words of the
Constitution, said Justice Fortas in 1968, "were not written with a meaning
that persists for all time." Such words, he observed, "are subject to the changes
that a restless life brings upon them."
24
Notwithstanding his great respect for the use of historical materials, the
second Justice Harlan readily acknowledged that the broad concepts abounding
in the Constitution are to be construed "in light of evolving needs and circum-
242 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
243 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934).
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245 Solesbee v. Balkeom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
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stances."24 In 1972, a majority of the Court construed the "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause with a noticeable disregard for the limited meaning those
words had in 1791; Justice Powell lamented in dissent: "The Court rejects as
not decisive the clearest evidence that the Framers of the Constitution and the
authors of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that those documents posed no
barrier to the death penalty."2 9
Adoption of a sociological jurisprudence has inclined some scholars to vir-
tually reject the legitimacy of the search for framers' intent in constitutional con-
struction. Miller and Howell in 1960 wrote of judicial deference to framers'
intent as "a filiopietistic notion that can have little place in the adjudicative
process of the latter half of the twentieth century-if, indeed, it ever did. 250
The late Professor TenBroek characterized the Supreme Court's traditional em-
phasis upon framers' intent as one of its "fundamental doctrinal fallacies," and
forecast in 1939 that such intent will readily be overlooked when the majority
of the Justices agree upon another construction.25'
The Supreme Court's construction of the Constitution will increasingly be
the result of a conscious identification, weighing and balancing of societal in-
terests. Inquiries into the values of the Founding Fathers, however, will remain
important; generally the interests placed on the scales of a jurisprudence of in-
terests will be not the ephemeral interests of a fleeting majority but the long-range
interests of our society. The commitment of the constitutional generation to the
dignity of the individual, to freedom of communication, and to an open society
will not readily be forgotten by a court methodologically committed to such a
jurisprudence.
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